Abstract. Matsui's linear cryptanalysis for iterated block ciphers is generalized by replacing his linear expressions with I O sums. For a single round, an I O sum is the XOR of a balanced binary-valued function of the round input and a balanced binary-valued function of the round output. The basic attack is described and conditions for it to be successful are given. A procedure for nding e ective I O sums, i.e., I O sums yielding successful attacks, is given. A cipher contrived to be secure against linear cryptanalysis but vulnerable to this generalization of linear cryptanalysis is given. Finally, it is argued that the ciphers IDEA and SAFER K-64 are secure against this generalization.
Introduction
Linear cryptanalysis, which w as introduced by Matsui in Mat93 to attack DES, is an attack that applies to any iterated block cipher. In this paper, we d e v elop a generalized version of linear cryptanalysis that widens somewhat the class of ciphers for which the attack will be successful and that provides additional insight i n to Matsui's attack.
In Section 2, we de ne an I O sum for one round as the XOR of a balanced binary-valued function of the round input and a balanced binary-valued function of the round output. This generalizes Matsui's linear expressions". We also introduce key-dependent i m balance and average-key imbalance as measures for the usefulness of an I O sum.
In Section 3, we adapt Matsui's linear cryptanalysis to the use of I O sums. We describe a basic attack that exploits a multi-round I O sum for the entire cipher excluding the last round and tries to nd the last-round key. However, all Matsui's improvements on the basic attack can easily be applied to this generalization. In Section 4, we formulate the hypothesis of wrong-key randomization, which states that using a wrong key in the last round to estimate an I O sum decreases its key-dependent imbalance. The generalized attack succeeds if it is based on an I O sum satisfying this hypothesis and if enough plaintext ciphertext pairs are available.
?? This is a version of a paper to be presented at Eurocrypt'95 with additional proofs.
Section 5 treats the case where the average-key imbalance of an I O sum is unknown. To handle this case, we i n troduce a threefold sum as an I O sum XORed with a binary-valued function of the key and show that the imbalance of the threefold sum is a lower bound on the average-key imbalance of the parent I O sum. In practice, nding e ective I O sums is done by nding e ective threefold sums whose imbalance is much easier to compute.
In Section 6, we develop a procedure for nding e ective homomorphic" threefold sums. This procedure relies on Matsui's piling-up lemma and applies to ciphers whose round function is a cascade of a keyed group operation and a possibly-keyed bijective function. We argue that ciphers that insert keys by certain modulo operations, such as IDEA and SAFER, are generally resistant t o this procedure, and we show that, after a slight modi cation, the procedure can be applied to DES-like ciphers too.
Section 7 de nes QRweak, a mini-cipher vulnerable to the generalization of linear cryptanalysis, but secure against di erential and linear cryptanalysis. We also argue that the cipher IDEA is secure against the generalization of linear cryptanalysis by s h o wing that the presented procedure for nding e ective h omomorphic threefold sums nds no e ective threefold sum for one round of either IDEA8 or IDEA16. We also show that SAFER has this desirable property.
Section 8 summarizes the main results.
Preliminaries
An r-round iterated block cipher of block-size n Fig. 1 consists of r successive applications of a keyed r ound function, with a di erent k ey in each round. The full key is K 1::r := K 1 ; : : : ; K r , where K i is the round key applied in the i-th round for i = 1 ; 2; : : : ; r . The round keys take o n v alues in a set K, the round key space. The plaintext X and ciphertext Y take v alues in X, the set of binary n-tuples. For each round key k, the keyed round function F k is a bijection on X. Let Y i denote the output n-tuple of the i-th round so that Y = Y r , and let Y 0 := X. Throughout this paper, capital letters such as X, Y , Y 1 ,Ỹ r,1 , K 1 , etc. will denote random variables and the corresponding lowercase letters will denote speci c values of these random variables, e.g., xed keys. A superscript will specify the rounds to which a variable is associated, e.g., Y r,1 is the output of the r ,1-th round, K 1::r,1 is the tuple of round keys from the rst to the r , 1-th round, etc.
We always assume that the plaintext and all keys used within the cipher are independent and uniformly random over the appropriate spaces, except when we explicitly x the keys by specifying, e.g., K 1::r = k 1::r . This assumption de nes the random experiment on which linear cryptanalysis is formalized and for which all probabilities are calculated. A binary-valued function is balanced if it takes on the value 0 for exactly half of its possible arguments and the value 1 otherwise. In Mat93 , Matsui exploits a cipher's weakness that he expresses in terms of linear expressions". In Matsui's terminology, a linear expression for one round is an equation" for a certain modulo-two s u m of round input bits and round output bits as a sum of round key bits. The expression should be satis ed with probability m uch more or much less than 0.5 to be useful. Our generalization of linear cryptanalysis resides in replacing Matsui As a measure for the e ectiveness" of a linear expression in an attack, Matsui uses the magnitude of the di erence between 1 2 and the probability that the expression is satis ed. We will instead use imbalances", which are similarly de ned but with an extra factor of two so that the imbalance will lie between 0 and 1 inclusive.
De nition 2. The imbalance IV of a binary-valued random variable V whose values are the real numbers 0 and 1 is the non-negative real number j2P V = 0 , 1j or, equivalently, jE 2V , 1 j, where P V = 0 is the probability that V takes on the value 0 and E : denotes expectation.
The key-dependent imbalance IS 1:: j k 1:: of the I O sum S 1:: is the imbalance of this sum conditioned on the event that K 1:: = k 1:: . The averagekey imbalance of the I O sum S 1:: is the expectation of these key-dependent imbalances and will be denoted as IS 1:: . An I O sum is e ective if it has a large average-key imbalance, and is guaranteed if its average-key imbalance is 1, the maximum possible.
As an example, suppose that S 1 = f X gY 1 = hK 1 w h e r e h is a balanced function. Then S 1 has imbalance IS 1 = IhK 1 = 0. However, because S 1 = hk 1 , a constant, when K 1 = k 1 , the key-dependent i m balance of S 1 is 1 for all keys k 1 and hence the average-key imbalance is also 1. Thus S 1 is a guaranteed I O sum. 4. Output all keysk that maximize jc k , N 2 j as candidates for the key actually used in the last round.
The quantity c k is proportional to an obvious estimate of the key-dependent imbalance of the I O sum under the assumption thatk is the right k ey. U n d e r suitable statistical assumptions, Step 4 implements the maximum-likelihood decision rule for the last-round key when the counts are considered to be the observation MPWW94 .
The basic attack m ust in practice be speeded up by exploiting key equivalence". Two k eys k;k 0 2 K are equivalent if g r,1 F ,1 k 0 y = g r,1 F ,1 k y c for some c and for all y 2 X. The basic attack can never distinguish between equivalent k eys. Therefore, we consider in Step 2 only one representative o f e a c h key equivalence class. Just as di erential and conventional linear cryptanalysis determine only some portion of the last-round key, the generalization of linear cryptanalysis determines only the equivalence class in which the true key lies. The key class containing the actual key used in the last round is the right class and its representative i s t h e right key. The other key classes are wrong classes and their representatives are wrong keys. In practice, the numberofkey classes must be reasonably small, since the computation in the attack is proportional to that number.
The success probability p GLC of the attack is the probability o f t h e e v ent that the output list contains only the right class. The conditional success probability p GLCjk 1::r is the probability of this event when the key K 1::r = k 1::r . M a tsui considers in Mat86 an improvement of linear cryptanalysis similar to list decoding" of error-detecting codes LH86 . Applied to our generalization, this improvement consists of trying out all keys in all equivalence classes in order of decreasing apparent imbalance jc k , N 2 j until the true key is found. The e ciency of such an algorithm can be measured by the average run-time, or by the expected position o GLC of the right class after the described ordering. The basic attack can also be speeded up as was done in Mat86 by rst classifying all p c-pairs in Step 2 into text classes each consisting of p c-pairs that cause the same set of counters to be incremented and then incrementing the counters once for each text class. Matsui also improved his attack by determining the key to the rst and the last round simultaneously Mat86 . We can use an r , 2-round I O sum S 2::r,1 instead of S 1::r,1 for a similar improvement of our basic attack. The key classes are then subsets of K 2 ; let k f ;k l b e a k ey 
Success of the Generalization of Linear Cryptanalysis
Theorem 3 below states that using enough p c-pairs in the basic generalization of linear cryptanalysis reveals information on the last-round key provided that the following hypothesis holds.
Hypothesis of wrong-key randomization for an r-1-round I O sum. Let S 1::r,1 = g 0 X g r,1 Y r,1 be a n e e ctive I O sum for the cipher in Theorem 3. Suppose that S 1::r,1 is an e ective r , 1-round I O sum for which the hypothesis of wrong-key randomization in the basic attack holds. Then, for virtually all keys, the generalization of linear cryptanalysis with I O sum S 1::r,1 nds the key class in which the true key of the last round lies as reliably as desired p r ovided that su ciently many randomly chosen p c-pairs are available.
Proof. Let k r be the representative of the right class andk a wrong key. S u ppose that S 1::r,1 is an e ective I O sum. In the basic attack, the counter c k r is incremented each time with probability either p r := P g 0 Xg r,1 Y r,1 = 0 j K 1::r,1 = k 1::r,1 o r 1 , p r , whereas c k is incremented only with probability either p w := P g 0 X g r,1 Ỹ r,1 = 0 j K 1::r = k 1::r ;K =k or 1 , p w . According to the hypothesis of wrong-key randomization for this I O sum, p w is substantially closer to 1 2 than p r for virtually all keys. Then, by the weak law of large numbers, the probability that c k is closer to N 2 than c k r can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by c hoosing the number N of di erent analyzed p c-pairs large enough. u t By using similar arguments, Matsui showed that, for a xed key k 1::r , the success probability of linear cryptanalysis is approximately proportional in our notation to IS 1::r,1 j k 1::r 2 where S 1::r,1 is the considered I O sum Mat86, M a t 9 3 . The crucial point is that the success probability is an increasing function of the key-dependent i m balance of the considered I O sum, which suggests that this imbalance is a robust measure for the usefulness of such a sum.
Note that even all possible p c-pairs may not be enough for the generalization of linear cryptanalysis to be successful. However, the attack is practical only if many f e w er than the total number of possible p c-pairs are required.
Random Keys and Threefold Sums
The success probability p GLC of an attack exploiting the I O sum S 1::r,1 depends on the average-key imbalance IS 1::r,1 i n a p p r o ximately the same manner as p GLCjk 1::r depends on IS 1::r,1 j k 1::r . This approximation is virtually exact when the key-dependent imbalances for all keys are virtually equal. We state this as a hypothesis, which is analogous to the hypothesis of stochastic equivalence for di erential cryptanalysis LMM91 .
Hypothesis of xed-key equivalence for an I O sum. The key-dependent imbalance of an e ective I O sum S 1::r,1 is virtually independent of the key k 1::r,1 ; m o r e p r ecisely, I S 1::r,1 j k 1::r,1 IS 1::r,1 4 is satis ed for virtually all keys k 1::r,1 that can result from the cipher's key scheduling algorithm.
In fact, the average-key imbalance gives us valuable information even without the hypothesis of xed key equivalence. For example, if IS 1::r,1 = 2 ,100 , w e know that at most a fraction 2 ,40 of the keys will give a k ey-dependent i m balance greater than 2 ,60 . S u c h an argument a l l o ws one to bound the numberof weak keys" for a cipher and suggests that average-key imbalance is a robustly good measure for the usefulness of an I O sum.
The cryptanalyst needs to nd I O sums that are e ective for many or virtually all keys. One possibility is to assume that the given hypothesis holds for any I O sum, x the key, calculate the key-dependent i m balance by M o n te Carlo methods for virtually all possible I O sums, and then select the most e ective ones. We describe below an alternative procedure that requires far less computation. To f o r m ulate this procedure requires us to introduce the notion of threefold sums.
De nition 4. A threefold sum T i for the i-th round is a modulo-two sum of three terms: the rst, a balanced binary-valued function f i of the round input Y i,1 ; the second, a balanced binary-valued function g i of the round output Y i ; and the third, some binary-valued function h i of the round key K i ; i.e.,
The function h i is the key function of the threefold sum. Note that the rst part of the expression for T i is the I O sum S i cf. 1. We will call S i the parent I O sum for T i . The imbalance of a threefold sum is calculated under our universal assumption that the arguments of the input function and of the key function are independent and uniformly distributed.
We The example below indicates that the r , 1-round threefold sums used in Matsui's linear cryptanalysis of DES are not likely to have a maximizing key function thus their imbalances provide only a lower bound on the average-key imbalance of the parent I O sum. Matsui's approximated success probability i s then a pessimistic estimate of the true success probability. In fact, Matsui has noted that his attacks perform better than predicted. We s h o w in Section 6 how to nd the imbalance of threefold sums ShK for a particular family H of key functions h. O b viously IS max h2H IS hK, but the right side is often a good approximation to IS. As it is generally infeasible to compute IS exactly, one has to rely on such an approximation when trying to nd e ective threefold sums. Section 6 describes such families of key functions for which w e are able to compute this approximate imbalance. overlap with other stars. To compute the average-key imbalances of the I O sum, we h a ve to nd the cipher output for each k ey and input combination. For such a small cipher, this is still feasible. We observe that the average-key imbalances of the I O sum may be strictly larger than the approximate imbalances, even for a pair yielding the greatest approximate imbalance. It follows that the sum of threefold sums each with maximizing key function does not always have a maximizing key function, even if the imbalance of this sum is the largest possible. There are eight threefold sums with the greatest average-key imbalance 9 32, e.g., the one with a; c = 2 ; 10. 3 If one of these threefold sums is used in an attack, the estimation of the success probability based on the approximate imbalance 8 32 will be pessimistic. Nonetheless, the highest approximate imbalance is quite close to the true average-key imbalance.
Finally, w e analyze one of the most e ective I O sums, namely the one with a; c = 2 ; 10, more closely. The key-dependent i m balances vary between IS 2;10 k 1::3 = 5 ; 2; t = 0 and IS 2;10 k 1::3 = 5 ; 0; t = 0 :5 for t 2 f 0; 1g 4 . This means that the hypothesis of xed-key equivalence is not valid.
6 Finding E ective Threefold Sums 6.1 Applicability of Matsui's Piling-Up Lemma"
In the language of threefold sums, Matsui's piling-up lemma becomes the statement that the imbalance of a sum of threefold sums is the product of their imbalances, i.e., where the function MSB gives the most signi cant bit of its argument. It is easy to check that IT 1 = IT 2 = 1 2 the threefold sums are equal to 0 if there is no carry bit, i.e., with probability 1 Thus, the piling-up formula does not hold and hence we can conclude that T 1 and T 2 are not independent. We also note that T 1 T 2 does not have a maximizing key function and that the average-key imbalance of the parent I O sum is 1 2 , w h i c h also does not satisfy the piling-up formula. The reason that Matsui's piling-up lemma is of interest is that, in actual ciphers, it is infeasible to evaluate a multi-round imbalance directly, as this would involve e v aluating the multi-round output for all input and key combinations. One is forced to nd imbalances of one-round threefold sums and then use Matsui's piling-up lemma to nd the imbalance of their sum. If these one-round threefold sums are linked, we t h us get the multi-round threefold sum imbalance, which g i v e s a l o wer bound on the average-key imbalance of the parent I O sum. The above example indicates the desirability of conditions guaranteeing the independence of one-round threefold sums, since the piling-up formula 9 applied to dependent threefold sums can suggest misleading results. The following lemma speci es such a condition.
Lemma 6. For an iterated cipher as in Fig. 1 with independent round keys, let T i be a threefold sum for the i-th round. If for each i = 2; : : : ; , T i is independent of the round input Y i,1 , then the threefold sums T 1 ; : : : ; T are independent.
Proof. In this proof, we will use the principle for uncertainty that HV j f U HV j U; f U = HV j U for any function f . Furthermore, since the chain For example, a one-round homomorphic threefold sum, independent of its input, for a cipher that inserts the key K i L with the group operation i " at the entry of the i-th round, is L is independent o f y i,1 , a n d T i is independent of its input Y i,1 , for all i = 2; : : : ; . By Lemma 6, T 1 ; : : : ; T are independent. Secondly, a s i :; k i R is always a bijection and X is uniformly distributed, X;Y 2 ; : : : ; Y are uniformly distributed. Therefore, Matsui's piling-up lemma applies. By Proposition 5, we obtain 12. u t It follows that one can nd an e ective -round threefold sum for a cipher whose round functions have a group operation at the entry cf. 11 as follows:
1. For i = 1 ; : : : ; + 1, nd the set H i of all binary functions on X that are homomorphisms for i ".
2. For i = 1 ; : : : ; , nd the imbalance of all i-th-round homomorphic threefold sums with input function g i,1 2 H i and output function g i 2 H i+1 .
Discard the threefold sums with small imbalance. 3. Consider each possible list of linked threefold sums containing one threefold sum found in Step 2 for each round. Use Theorem 8 to nd the imbalance of the -round threefold sum that can be written as the sum of all threefold sums in the same list. Find the -round threefold sum with the largest imbalance.
Discussion of the Given Procedure
The complexity of the above procedure depends mainly on the number of homomorphisms onto f0; 1g; for the group operations. If i " is the bitwise XOR operation in X, the only such homomorphisms are the linear functions de ned by l a x = a x for all x 2 X , where a is a non-zero n-tuple. An I O sum or a threefold sum whose input and output functions are l a and l b , respectively, i s called linear with linear-mask a; b. If all group operations i " are the XOR operation, the given procedure considers only threefold sums whose component functions are linear. Thus for DES and other ciphers using XOR, the given procedure leads to no improvement of Matsui's method for nding e ective linear expressions and to no real generalization of his linear cryptanalysis. For the two groups f0; 1g n ; m ultiplication modulo 2 n + 1 w i t h n = 2 ; 4; 8 or 16, and 0 representing 2 n and f0; 1g n ; + addition modulo 2 n o f o r d e r 2 n used in IDEA Lai92, LMM91 , there exists only one homomorphism, viz. the quadratic residue function QR for and the parity function i.e., the least signi cant bit function LSB for + . For ciphers using these operations, there are only very few possible linked threefold-sums, so that there is little chance that one of the corresponding threefold sums is e ective. Thus the procedure for nding e ective homomorphic threefold sums and the generalization of linear cryptanalysis is not very powerful against most ciphers using such operations to insert the key.
It is generally infeasible to analyze the imbalances of all possible threefold sums and even infeasible to nd the imbalance of a single r ,1-round threefold sum if one cannot deduce it from the imbalances of smaller sections such as rounds or S-boxes by using Matsui's piling-up lemma. The only threefold sums we know to which Matsui's piling-up lemma applies are homomorphic. We are aware of no practical alternative for nding imbalances. The procedure given in this section considers promising candidates for the most e ective threefold sum, but it never guarantees that the threefold sum found is the most e ective possible.
Example 3. To show that such a guarantee does not exist, we consider the 3-bit round function F de ned by Y = F K X = X + K where the function table of is := 0; 1; 3; 5; 2; 4; 7; 6. The only homomorphic function l for + is given by l = 0 ; 1; 0; 1; 0; 1; 0; 1. Since IlX lY = 0 , but If X lY = 1 4 for f := 1; 1; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0, the threefold sum with input function f has higher imbalance than the only homomorphic threefold sum.
Application to DES
A procedure for nding e ective homomorphic threefold sums for DES has been implemented in Mat94 . It is similar to our procedure, but it requires more ingenuity to link threefold sums e ciently as there exist many guaranteed oneround threefold sums. The following example illustrates how one-round threefold sums that are independent of their input are constructed. By Lemma 6, this guarantees that Matsui's piling-up lemma is applicable when we cascade them. Since the I O sum S 2 linked to both T 1 and T 3 is guaranteed, T 1::3 with T 2 = S 2 has imbalance IT 1 IT 3 = 25 64 , which is quite e ective.
7 Some Examples
The QRweak Cipher
We now contrive a cipher, QRweak, to be weak against our generalization of linear cryptanalysis, but secure against linear and di erential cryptanalysis. QRweak is a four round iterated block cipher of block-size eight Fig. 1 aim is to nd the key of the last round, given that all p c-pairs are known. The only homomorphic one-round threefold sum that is independent of the input is QRX QRY QRK and has imbalance I QR = 21 64 , where QR is the quadratic residues modulo 2 8 + 1 function. The parent I O sum of the two a n d a half"-round threefold sum QRX QRY 2 K 3 QRK 1 QRK 2 QRK 3 with imbalance 21 64 2 = 10:77 is used in our attack. The success probability is p GLC 5:5, whereas linear and di erential cryptanalysis as well as random key guessing yield a success probability o f o n l y a b o u t 0 :39. We conclude that QRweak is less secure against our generalization than against linear and di erential cryptanalysis. On the one hand, we h a ve deliberately chosen the as a function, among all functions permuting bits and adding a constant, that has large I QR and whose maximum di erential has small probability. On the other hand, it is easy to nd a function with any homomorphic threefold sum imbalance I QR that nevertheless has a small maximum di erential probability. T h us, by allowing to be de ned by a function table, one can considerably increase the success probability of our attack without improving the di erential and the linear cryptanalysis.
Cryptanalysis of IDEA
We n o w apply the procedure for nding e ective homomorphic threefold sums to the cipher IDEA Lai92 , earlier called IPES LMM91 . The round function is a function on 64-bit words, consisting of a group operation denoted by , a k eyed involution I n and a permutation P I . Each 64-bit word X can be considered as a concatenation of four 16-bit words X1; X 2; X 3; X 4 and denoted as a 4-tuple. The group operation is de ned as X K := X1 K1; X2 + K2; X3 + K3; X4 K4, where denotes multiplication modulo 2 16 +1 with 0 representing 2 16 , and + addition modulo 2 16 . As there exists only one non-constant homomorphism for + a n d o n l y o n e f o r , there exist 2 4 , 1 homomorphisms for , namely the functions f i X = i1 QRX1 i2 LSBX2 i3 LSBX3 i4 QRX4 13 for all binary four-tuples i = i1 i2 i3 i4 di erent from 0000, where QR is the quadratic-residue modulo 2 16 + 1 function.
A homomorphic I O sum for IDEA can be characterized by the IDEA-mask a; b where the non-zero 4-tuple a is the mask of the input function and the non-zero 4-tuple b the mask of the output function.
We try to nd e ective homomorphic one-round I O sums. For some of the 225 IDEA-masks, e.g., 1110; 0100, we can show that the average-key imbalance, and thus all key-dependent imbalances, are zero. For other IDEA-masks, it is computationally infeasible to evaluate the key-dependent i m balances exactly. F or the mini-cipher IDEA8, the average-key imbalance of all one-round homomorphic I O sums are zero. For IDEA16, the one-round I O sums with IDEAmasks 1111; 1011, 1101; 1111, 1011; 1001, and 1001; 1101 have averagekey imbalance 0.002441, the four with 1111; 1001, 1001; 1111, 1101; 1101, and 1011; 1011 have average-key imbalance 0.00122, and all other I O sum average-key imbalances are zero. Moreover, the number of p c-pairs that must be analyzed in the generalization of linear cryptanalysis is about the square of the key-dependent imbalance and is here far larger than the total number of p c-pairs. We conclude that the procedure for nding e ective homomorphic threefold sums does not nd any e ective threefold sum for IDEA8 and IDEA16. Furthermore, the maximum key-dependent homomorphic I O sum imbalance is only 0.00586. As this is only slightly larger than the maximum I O sum average-key imbalance, there are no weak keys for the MA-box with respect to our attack. These conclusions doubtlessly hold true for full-sized IDEA as well. Thus IDEA seems secure against the generalization of linear cryptanalysis.
Cryptanalysis of SAFER
SAFER is an iterated block-cipher, presented by Massey in Mas94 . The round function of SAFER consists of two half-rounds, each consisting of a keyed group operation and an unkeyed bijection either consisting of exponential and logarithm functions modulo 257 or a Pseudo-Hadamard Transform". We h a ve been able to prove that the procedure for nding e ective homomorphic threefold sums for SAFER for a cascade of half-rounds containing at least two PseudoHadamard-Transforms" does not nd a homomorphic threefold sum with nonzero imbalance Har95 . This strengthens our believe that SAFER after only three of the suggested six rounds seems secure against the generalization of linear cryptanalysis.
Conclusion
We h a ve de ned a generalization of linear cryptanalysis of iterated block ciphers and focused on its basic attack, which exploits an e ective r , 1-round I O sum to nd information about the key of the last round. We have given sucient conditions for a successful basic attack. These results can be extended to non-basic attacks in a manner similar to Matsui's improvements on basic linear cryptanalysis Mat86 .
We have given a careful analysis of the applicability of Matsui's piling-up lemma. For the family of ciphers that insert keys by group operations, we h a ve developed a procedure for nding some arguably the best, but not necessarily all e ective multi-round threefold sums. This procedure requires nding homomorphisms for the used group operations. For ciphers using XOR such as DES, the procedure nds only linear threefold sums, which are the same as Matsui's linear expressions. For ciphers using modular addition and multiplication with large moduli such as IDEA, the choice of homomorphic sums is severely limited so that such ciphers tend to be immune to our generalization of linear cryptanalysis.
Finally, w e argued that IDEA is secure against the generalization of linear cryptanalysis by s h o wing that the presented procedure for nding e ective homomorphic threefold sums nds no e ective threefold sum for IDEA8 or for IDEA16. Similarly, w e believe that SAFER is secure against the generalization of linear cryptanalysis after only three of the suggested six rounds because the procedure for nding e ective homomorphic threefold sums for SAFER does not nd a homomorphic threefold sum with non-zero imbalance for this attack.
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